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Abstract
We develop a theoretical model based on efficient bargaining, where both log outside
productivity and log productivity in the current job follow a random walk. This setting
allows the application of real option theory. We derive the efficient worker-firm separation
rule. We show that wage data from completed job spells are uninformative about the true
tenure profile. The model is estimated on the PSID. It fits the observed distribution of job
tenures well. Selection of favourable random walks can account for the concavity in tenure
profiles. About 80% of the estimated wage returns to tenure is due to selectivity in the
realized outside productivities.
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1 Introduction
A large empirical literature has looked at wage returns to job tenure, see Farber (1999) for a
survey. The conclusions of this research still diverge, despite analyzing data from the same
countries (mainly the USA) or even the same longitudinal datasets (mostly the PSID), see, e.g.,
Altonji and Shakotko (1987), Abraham and Farber (1987), Altonji and Williams (1997, 2005),
Abowd et al (1999); Topel (1991), Dustmann and Meghir (2005), Buchinsky et al (2010). Here,
we propose a new direction for this line of research. From a theoretical point of view, large
"true" returns to tenure are problematic. Why would a worker separate when she loses her
tenure profile by doing so? Hence, separation is likely to be induced by the firm, what we call a
layoff. But why would the worker and the firm prefer separation above renegotiation? Although
some models offer explanations for this, the size of the reported wage returns to tenure remains
puzzling.
This paper addresses explicitly whether the data is consistent with efficient separations,
by modelling simultaneously the evolution of wages and the distribution of job tenures. The
model explains the correlation between wages and job tenure from the random evolution of
both the job’s inside productivity and the outside productivity, i.e. the productivity in the best
alternative job. Separation occurs when the value of the inside productivity falls below the
outside productivity. By some form of bargaining, log wages are a linear combination of the
in- and outside log productivity. Then, wages and tenure are correlated because only those
jobs survive for which the inside productivity remains above the outside productivity. There is
no such thing as "the return to tenure" in this model. In some jobs wages go up because the
inside productivity evolves favorably. In other jobs wages go down for mutatis mutandis the
same reason. However, these jobs are gradually eliminated from the stock of ongoing job spells
because there are no options left for mutually gainful renegotiation.
We assume both log inside and outside productivities to follow Brownian motions. Since
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log wage is a linear combination of them, it also follows a random walk. The evolution of an
individual’s log wage is indeed reasonably described by a random walk with transitory shocks,
see, e.g., Abowd and Card (1989), or Meghir and Pistaferri (2004). What we call the return to
tenure is then the difference between the drifts of the log wage and of the log outside productivity.
Starting a job requires an irreversible specific investment, which is lost upon separation. The
combination of irreversibility and productivity following a random walk implies that we can
apply the theory of real options, see, e.g., Dixit (1989) and Dixit and Pyndick (1994), compare
Teulings and Van der Ende (2000). The predicted hazard rates of this model are well in line
with the empirical distribution of job exits. From the distribution of job tenures we are able to
estimate the surplus of the inside over the outside productivity, and the drift of this surplus. We
obtain a positive drift, indicating that some 10% of all jobs will end only by retirement. We use
these results to compute the evolution of the expected surplus, conditioning on both the date of
job start and of job termination, an empirical strategy explored earlier by Abraham and Farber
(1987). Our model predicts this variable to be correlated to the evolution of wages.
We obtain the following results. First, a closed form expression is computed for the expected
surplus in completed job spells. We show this not to depend on the drift of the surplus. The
evolution of wages in completed spells is thus uninformative on the return to tenure in this
model, since the effect of the drift is exactly offset by the selection due to the elimination of bad
matches. This is an unexpected conclusion, given that so many studies have tried to identify
the return to tenure from this type of data. Second, we show that our model can easily explain
the observed concavity in the tenure profile from the selection effect. Selection is much more
important than the drift. Third, we show that the selection effect is driven by the selectivity
in the outside, as opposed to the inside, productivity. Workers switch jobs mainly when the
outside productivity is high, not so much when the inside productivity is low. Selectivity in the
outside option accounts for 50 to 80% of the tenure profile. This source of selectivity usually
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receives little attention in the literature on wage-tenure profiles, though it figures in models of
equilibrium on-the-job-search, e.g., Burdett and Mortensen (1998). In this search literature,
closest to us are "persistent earnings dynamics" studies by Postel-Vinay and Turon (2010) and
Low et al (2010); unlike them, our wage process does not require nesting within models of search,
or classic ARMA decomposition. Finally, our estimation results suggest downward rigidity in
wages, as discussed, e.g., by Beaudry and DiNardo (1991). This downward rigidity does not fit
the efficient bargaining hypothesis. Our estimates also provide evidence of excess variance in
wages for job movers, implying failure of our Walrasian market assumption for outside offers.
The paper is structured as follows: the model is discussed in Section 2, the identification
and the estimation are set out in Section 3, and the empirical analysis is presented in Section 4.
2 The Random Productivity Growth Model
2.1 Model Assumption
Consider a labor market in continuous time, where both workers and firms are risk neutral. We
focus on a single cohort of homogeneous workers. We normalize our measure of time t such that
it is also equal to the workers’ experience. There is no disutility of effort, so that the workers’
utility depends on their expected lifetime income only. Each firm offers a single job, of which
the job specific productivity Pt evolves according to a geometric Brownian motion with drift.
At the moment a worker is hired for a vacant job, a specific investment has to be made which is
partly paid by the firm and partly by the worker, and which is irreversibly lost upon separation
between the worker and the firm. However, the firm retains the option value on the vacancy:
it can hire a new worker at any future time, provided that the cost of the specific investment
is paid again. The investment is verifiable. There is no search cost involved from either party
in finding a new job: an unemployed worker can just pick the most attractive vacancy that is
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available at that time, at zero cost. Let Rt be the return on this vacancy, net of the cost of
investment; Rt is exogenous in this model. Like Pt, it evolves according to a geometric Brownian
motion with drift. Both workers and firms are perfectly informed about the current values of
Pt and Rt, but their future evolution is unknown. The value of the specific investments for a
job starting at time t is RtI. One can think of I as the cost of investment measured in units of
labor time and of Rt as the price of one unit at time t. Using lower cases to denote the logs of
the corresponding upper cases, the law of motion of pt and rt, for t > s, is characterized by a
bivariate normal distribution:

 pt − ps
rt − rs

 ∼ N [(t− s)µ, (t− s)Σ]
where:
µ =

 µp
µr

 ,Σ =

 σ
2
p σpr
σpr σ2r

 (1)
Since µr is the drift in the log outside option of the worker, it can be interpreted as the sum of
the return to experience and the secular growth in real wages due to technological progress. The
worker and the firm bargain over the surplus of the productivity of the job above the shadow
price of a worker, Pt −Rt. This bargaining is efficient: as long as there is a surplus, the worker
and the firm will agree on a sharing rule. In the empirical application in Sections 3 and 4, I and
µp will be allowed to depend on personal characteristics. For the derivation of the model this
dependence on personal characteristics can be ignored.
2.2 Value of a Job and a Vacancy
Three assumptions made above greatly simplify the analysis. (i) The risk neutrality of both
players implies that the allocation of risk is irrelevant: only expected values matter. (ii) The
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verifiability of investment implies that there are no hold up problems: the distribution of future
surplusses Pt−Rt, t > s, is irrelevant for the timing of the investment decision, since the cost of
the specific investment RsI can always be shared between the worker and the firm according to
their share in future surplusses. Hence, the investment decision will maximize the joint expected
surplus of the worker and the firm. (iii) Efficient bargaining implies that separation decisions
will also maximize the joint expected surplus. Hence, separation occurs at mutual consent when
there are no gains from trade left. Quits and layoffs are therefore observationally equivalent,
as in McLaughlin (1991). For convenience, we shall refer to a separation as the firm firing the
worker, though it can be both a quit or a layoff. Given these assumptions, wage setting and
separation decisions can be analyzed separately: in the spirit of the Coase theorem, hiring and
firing decisions maximize the joint expected surplus, regardless of its distribution.
First, we analyze hiring and firing. Since hiring requires an irreversible investment, while
firing is an irreversible disinvestment, both can be analysed using real option theory, see, e.g.,
Dixit and Pindyck (1994). The easiest way to analyze this problem is to assume that workers
always get paid their shadow price Rt. Then, hiring and firing simply maximize the expected
value of the firm. Let V (pt, rt) and J (pt, rt) be the expected present value of a vacancy and
respectively of a job, as functions of pt and rt. Applying Ito’s lemma, the Bellman equations for
both value functions read, compare Dixit and Pindyck (1994: pp.140-141):
ρJ = exp(pt)− exp(rt) + µpJp + µrJr +
1
2
σ2pJpp + σprJpr +
1
2
σ2rJrr (2)
ρV = µpVp + µrVr +
1
2
σ2pVpp + σprVpr +
1
2
σ2rVrr
where we leave out the arguments of J (·) and V (·) for convenience, and where ρ denotes the
interest rate. The term exp(pt) − exp(rt) in the first equation is the value of current output
minus the wage of the worker; the other terms capture the wealth effects due to changes in the
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state variables pt and rt: the first order derivatives capture the effect of the drift in both state
variables, the second order derivatives capture the effect of their variance. For optimal hiring
and firing, value matching and smooth pasting conditions should be satisfied:
J (pS , rS) = V (pS , rS) + exp(rS)I, V (pT , rT ) = J (pT , rT ) (3)
Jp (pS , rS) = Vp (pS , rS) , Vp (pT , rT ) = Jp (pT , rT )
where S is the moment of hiring and T is the moment of firing. The first two conditions are
the value matching conditions for hiring and firing respectively, the second pair of conditions
are the smooth pasting conditions for pt; the smooth pasting conditions for rt are redundant.
Value matching conditions impose value equality at the moment of hiring and firing; on top of
that, smooth pasting conditions impose that slight variations in pt should not affect the value
equality, since hiring and firing decisions are irreversible. Hence, a decision maker should not
regret her decision after slight variations in pt. The above conditions and the Bellman equations
(2) jointly determine J (·) and V (·).
Define bt ≡ pt−rt; bt is the log relative surplus Pt/Rt. By (1), bt−bs ∼ N
[
(t− s)µ, (t− s)σ2],
with
µ ≡ µp − µr, σ2 ≡ σ2p + σ2r − 2σpr (4)
Proposition 1 The value functions J (·) and V (·) can be written as J (pt, rt) = exp (rt) j (pt − rt)
and V (pt, rt) = exp (rt) v (pt − rt), where j (·) and v (·) satisfy:
(
ρ− µr −
1
2
σ2r
)
j = exp (bt)− 1 +
(
µ+ σpr − σ2r
)
j′ +
1
2
σ2j′′ (5)(
ρ− µr −
1
2
σ2r
)
v =
(
µ+ σpr − σ2r
)
v′ +
1
2
σ2v′′
leaving out the argument of j (·) and v (·) for convenience.
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Proof: The definition of j (·) and v (·) implies Jp = exp (rt) j′, Jpp = exp (rt) j′′, Jr =
exp (rt) (j − j′) , Jrr = exp (rt) (j − 2j′ + j′′), and Jpr = exp (rt) (j′ − j′′) , and likewise for V (·).
The proposition follows directly from substitution of these expressions in equation (2) and (3).
The factor ρ− µr − 12σ2r is a modified discount rate, which accounts for the fact that future
revenues are discounted at rate ρ, but increase in expectation at rate µr +
1
2σ
2
r due to the drift
and the variance of Rt. The hiring and separation rules depend therefore purely on bt: a vacancy
should be filled at the first time t that bt = b
S, a worker should be fired from the job at the
first time t that bt = b
T . This proposition characterizes the decision problem of the firm by
two second order differential equations, four boundary conditions and two decision parameters,
bS and bT , see Dixit and Pindyck (1994; ch. 5.1-5.2), to whom we refer for the subsequent
arguments. The two differential equations have an analytical solution. These solutions yield
four constants of integration. Two of these constants have to be zero due to transversality
conditions. The constants of integration reflect the option value for the firm of hiring and firing
a worker. The option value of hiring converges to zero when bt → 0, while the option value
of firing converges to zero when bt → ∞. These constraints can only be satisfied by setting
two constants of integration equal to zero. Hence, the four boundary conditions determine four
unknown parameters: bS , bT , and the two remaining constants of integration. One can prove
bT < 0 < bS . Hence, at the moment of hiring, PS > RS because the firm has to recoup the cost
of investment and because the investment is irreversible, so that the firm loses the option value
of delaying hires, while in the meantime bt might fall below bS at a later point in time. Similarly,
at the moment of firing, PT < RT because the firm accepts some losses before firing the worker,
since by doing so it loses the option value of firing the worker at a later point in time.
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2.3 Job Tenure Distribution
The duration of a job spell is a stochastic variable, equal to the time it takes the random
variable bt to travel down from b
S to bT . The standard deviation of bt is unidentified in this
model because, for any time t, we observe only whether the spell is still incomplete, implying
bt − bT > 0 ever since the start of the job spell. We can therefore normalize all parameters by
σ. For each job spell, we define τ ≡ t−S, with τ ≥ 0, and respectively Θ ≡ T −S, with Θ > 0;
τ is the incomplete tenure, while Θ is the completed tenure of that job spell. Define:
Ωτ ≡ bt − b
T
σ
, Ω ≡ b
S − bT
σ
> 0, π ≡ µ
σ
(6)
Thus Ωτ is a Brownian motion with drift π and unit variance per unit time. By construction,
Ω0 = Ω and ΩΘ = 0. Ω can be shown to be an implicit function of the model’s structural
parameters, I ≡ H (Ω, µ,Σ), withHΩ (·) > 0. Hence, we treat the parameter Ω as the parameter
of interest. If desired, the underlying structural parameter I can be recovered via the function
H
(
Ω, µ,Σ
)
.
The completed job spell Θ is determined by the time it takes Ωτ to pass the barrier Ωτ = 0
for the first time. This process satisfies the "First Passage Time" distribution, which has been
applied previously by Lancaster (1972) for modelling strike durations, and by Whitmore (1979)
for job spells. The unconditional density of Ωτ = ω reads:
1√
τ
φ
(
ω −Ω− πτ√
τ
)
where φ(·) is the standard normal PDF. However, a job spell is completed if and only if Ωt has
not been negative for any t ∈ [0, τ ]. Hence, we are interested in the density of Ωτ conditional on
Ωt > 0, ∀t ∈ [0, τ ]. For this conditioning, we can apply the Reflection Principle, first discussed
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by Feller (1968): there is a one-to-one correspondence between trajectories of Ωτ from Ω to
ω which have crossed the barrier Ωτ = 0 at least once, and trajectories of Ωτ from −Ω to ω.
These trajectories should therefore be subtracted to obtain the conditional density of Ωτ . Define:
g (ω, τ) ≡ Pr(Ωτ = ω ∧Θ > τ). It satisfies, see, e.g., Kijima (2003, p.185-187):
g (ω, τ) =
1√
τ
[
φ
(
ω −Ω− πτ√
τ
)
− e−2Ωπφ
(
ω +Ω− πτ√
τ
)]
(7)
where φ(.) is the standard normal density function. The first term in square brackets is the
unconditional density; the second is the effect of the conditioning. By the Reflection Principle,
the latter is the density of trajectories of Ωτ from −Ω to ω. The factor e−2Ωπ corrects for
the differential effect of the drift on the density for upward and downward trajectories. By
integrating out ω we get the cumulative distribution of jobs surviving at τ , F (τ) = Pr(Θ > τ):
F (τ) ≡ Φ
(
Ω+ πτ√
τ
)
− e−2ΩπΦ
(−Ω+ πτ√
τ
)
(8)
where Φ(.) is the standard normal CDF. This expression is identical to Whitmore (1979: eq. 2).
The distribution of Θ is therefore fully specified by two parameters, the initial distance from
the separation threshold Ω, and the drift π. Hence, Ω and π can be identified from data on
job tenures, while the parameter σ cannot. The corresponding density function is minus the
derivative of F (τ) with respect to τ :
f(τ) =
Ω
τ
√
τ
φ
(
Ω+ πτ√
τ
)
(9)
where we use φ
(
Ω+πτ√
τ
)
= e−2Ωπφ
(
−Ω+πτ√
τ
)
. The exit rate f(τ)/F (τ) can be shown to be hump
shaped, starting from 0, reaching a peak at τ∗, 0 < τ∗ < 23Ω
2, and afterwards either declining
monotonically to 0 for a positive drift π > 0, or to 1/2π2 for π < 0. Farber (1994) and Horowitz
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and Lee (2002) have documented this hump shaped pattern using NLSY data. A positive drift
π > 0 implies that some fraction of the started jobs will never end. This fraction is equal to the
survivor function (8) evaluated at τ →∞, hence to 1− e−2Ωπ.
In Figure 1, we plot the exit rates for the pairs Ω = e−1.20 ≃ 0.30, π = 0.14, and respectively
Ω = e−1.24 ≃ 0.29, π = 0.23, which are the two estimates for Ω and π for the mean values of
the observed and unobserved worker characteristics, see Section 3, Table 2. In both cases the
peak is reached at τ ≃ 0.04 years. Since π > 0, the hazard rate converges to zero and a positive
fraction of the jobs, about 10%, will never end.
0.5 1 1.5 2
t
1
2
3
4
5
Hazard Rate
surplus : 0.30 , drift : 0.14
surplus : 0.29 , drift : 0.23
Figure 1: Predicted Job Hazards
2.4 Tenure Profile in Wages
2.4.1 Sharing Rule of Surpluses and Wages
We extend this model with an explicit sharing rule of surpluses during the course of the job
spell. Ideally, we would derive this sharing rule from an explicit bargaining game, such as Nash
bargaining. For the sake of convenience, we use a simpler approach, imposing the log linearity of
the sharing rule a priori, and deriving the intercept of that rule from the assumption of efficient
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bargaining. According to this rule, the worker’s log wage wt satisfies:
wt = rt + β
(
bt − bT
)
+ ut = rt + σΩτ + ut (10)
where σ ≡ βσ. We assume ut is an i.i.d. random variable distributedN
(
0, σ2u
)
: this specification
of wages as following a random walk, Ωτ , with a transitory shock MA(1), ut, is broadly consistent
with a large number of studies on the dynamics of wages, see, e.g., MaCurdy (1982), Abowd and
Card (1989), Topel and Ward (1992), and Meghir and Pistaferri (2004). The parameter β can be
interpreted as the worker’s bargaining power. If β = 0, the wage is equal to the worker’s outside
productivity Rt, while if β = 1, the wage is her inside productivity Pt. The transitory error can
be interpreted as either measurement error in wages, see, e.g., Meghir and Pistaferri (2004), or
as short run fluctuations that do not affect the long run payoff of the specific investment I in
the current job. In either interpretation, these shocks do not affect the optimizing behavior of
agents regarding job change.
2.4.2 Selectivity in Tenure Profiles
Equation (10) implies that log wages within a job follow a Brownian motion with drift µr +
σπ; µr is the sum of the return to experience and the secular growth of real wages due to
technological progress; σπ is the deterministic part of the tenure profile. Were the realizations
of Ωτ independent of the completed job tenure Θ, σπ could be estimated easily. However, in
completed job spells, Ωτ is correlated to Θ for three reasons: (i) Ω0 = Ω, (ii) ΩΘ = 0, and (iii)
Ωt > 0,∀t, 0 ≤ t < Θ. For the sake of brevity, we refer to this information set as A (Θ). Mutatis
mutandis, the same applies to incomplete spells. Let Ψ be the incomplete tenure at the last
date for which data are available. Again, there are three pieces of information: (i) Ω0 = Ω, (ii)
Θ > Ψ, and hence (iii) Ωt > 0,∀t, 0 ≤ t ≤ Ψ. We refer to this second information set as B (Ψ).
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Proposition 2 Let m (τ) ≡ Θ−τΘ . E[Ωτ |A (Θ)] and its derivatives satisfy:
E [Ωτ |A (Θ)] = 2
√
m (τ) τφ
(√
m (τ) /τΩ
)
−
( τ
Ω
+m (τ)Ω
)[
1− 2Φ
(√
m (τ ) /τΩ
)]
lim
τ→0
dE [Ωτ |A (Θ)]
dτ
=
1
Ω
− Ω
Θ
, lim
τ→Θ
dE [Ωτ |A (Θ)]
dτ
= −∞, d
2E [Ωτ |A (Θ)]
dτ2
< 0
Proof See Appendix.
This proposition implies that E[Ωτ |A (Θ)] does not depend on the tenure profile in wages,
σπ; see also Van der Ende (1997). Hence, conditional on the model that we specified, the
evolution of wages in completed job spells does not provide any information whatsoever on the
tenure profile in wages. Given the many papers that have tried to estimate tenure profiles from
data on completed job spells, this is a very surprising conclusion. The intuition for this result
is that an increase in σπ has two offsetting effects on ∆E[Ωτ |A (Θ)]. On the one hand, it raises
the deterministic part of the tenure profile, so that the change in the unconditional expectation
∆E[Ωτ ] goes up. On the other hand, it makes separation a less likely event, so that the condition
A (Θ) becomes more informative: the higher is σπ, the more unfavourable the evolution of the
non-deterministic part of ∆Ωτ must have been to warrant a separation. Hence, the deterministic
part of the tenure profile does affect the job separation rate, but it does not affect the evolution
of wages, conditional on the moment of separation Θ.
The conclusion above depends crucially on the assumption of efficient bargaining. Ignoring
the impact of temporary shocks ut, this assumption dictates that the evolution of wages over a
job spell satisfies
(wS − rS)− (wT − rT ) = σΩ
see equation (10). The difference between the starting and the terminal value of this log relative
wage is equal to the worker’s share in the surplus due the specific investment in the job, σΩ.
Hence, irrespective of the steepness of the tenure profile σπ, or the job spell length Θ, log relative
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wages decline by σΩ over the duration of a completed job spell. However, π can be estimated
from the tenure distribution. Efficient bargaining implies that this distribution is informative
on the tenure profile, since under efficient bargaining a higher tenure profile means that jobs
will survive longer. From this perspective, data on the tenure distribution are more informative
on the return to tenure than data on wages.
The second relationship of Proposition 2 says that the initial slope of E[Ωτ |A (Θ)] is negative
for short spells, Θ < Ω2, even when the drift is positive, π > 0. For these spells, E[Ωτ |A (Θ)]must
decline immediately for ΩΘ = 0. The third expression shows that the expected surplus declines
infinitely fast just before separation. This is consistent with empirical evidence by Jacobson,
LaLonde and Sullivan (1993) on the decline in relative wages in the period just before firing.
The final expression shows that the second derivative is always negative. Hence, E[Ωτ |A (Θ)]
is concave in τ ; it is monotonically decreasing for short spells Θ < Ω2 and it is hump-shaped
for longer spells. Contrary to the case of completed spells, there is no explicit expression for
E[Ωτ |B (Ψ)]. Hence, we use numerical integration in this case, see the Appendix.
Figure 2 plots the evolution of E[Ωτ |·] for Ω = 0.30 and π = 0.14, for both completed spells
(continuous lines) and incomplete spells (dashed lines), with durations Θ and respectively Ψ in
{0.1, 2, 5, 10}. Moreover, the straight line shows the drift: Ω+ πτ . With respect to completed
spells, E[Ωτ |A (Θ)] is monotonically decreasing for Θ ≤ 0.1 year, and concave for larger Θ. The
top of the profile is increasing in Θ, showing the importance of conditioning on the eventual
tenure. With respect to incomplete spells, E[Ωτ |B (Ψ)] is increasing in Ψ. The reason is that
higher values of Ψ imply greater selectivity, since Θ > Ψ. Trajectories are strongly concave,
indicating that selection plays an important role. This can explain the observed concavity of
tenure profiles in log wages: the underlying profile might be linear, with the observed concavity
simply due to selection. The trajectories for both completed and incomplete spells are far above
the deterministic part, except for the final year(s) before separation: selection dominates.
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Figure 2: Expected surplus in completed and incomplete spells
The same analysis can be done for the second moment of Ωτ . Expressions for Var[∆Ωτ |A (Θ)]
and Var[∆Ωτ |B (Ψ)] can be found in the Appendix. In the absence of condition A (Θ), Var[∆Ωτ ]
would be equal to unity, see definition (6). However, conditions A (Θ) and B (Ψ) introduce
selectivity in the trajectories of the random walk.
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Figure 3: Variance surplus in completed spells
This selectivity reduces the variance, as shown in Figure 3. The variance is low initially,
because the positive constraint Ωτ over the course of a job spell is quite informative, and Ω0
is small. The same argument applies towards the end of completed spells, since ΩΘ = 0 by
construction. For longer spells, the variance converges to unity in the middle part of the spell.
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2.5 A Reinterpretation of the Wage Equation
The implications of our analysis on the selectivity in tenure profiles surface most clearly when
we rewrite equation (10), benefitting from a decomposition of the random variables [∆pt,∆rt]
into two orthogonal components [∆bt,∆zt]. We normalize ∆zt such that its marginal effect on
∆rt and ∆pt is equal to unity:
∆rt = ∆zt − γ∆bt
∆pt = ∆zt + γ∆bt
where ∆zt˜N
(
µz, σ
2
z
)
and where γ ≡ 1− γ, with:
µz = µr + γµp, σ
2
z = σ
−2 (σ2pσ2r − σ2pr) , γ = σ−2 (σ2r − σpr) (11)
This decomposition satisfies the constraint ∆pt −∆rt = ∆bt imposed by equation (4).
Since separation decisions are determined by the evolution of bt, and since ∆bt and ∆zt are
uncorrelated, selectivity affects ∆bt, but not ∆zt. Combining these definitions with equation
(10) yields:
∆wt = ∆zt + γβ∆bt +∆ut = ∆zt + γσ∆Ωτ +∆ut (12)
The parameter γ is a reflection of the correlation between the match surplus and the reservation
wage. In the one extreme case, γ = 0, we can write ∆pt = ∆rt + ∆bt, where the right-hand
side variables are uncorrelated. Then ∆rt reflects the evolution of the general human capital
of the worker, which evolves independently of the value of the specific capital in the present
job, ∆bt. Hence, the duration of the actual job is fully determined by its own (mis)fortune.
Though the distinction between quits and layoffs makes little sense in this model, separations
look like layoffs in this case: the firm fires the worker since she is no longer productive. In the
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opposite extreme case, γ = 1, we can write ∆rt = ∆pt−∆bt, again with uncorrelated right-hand
side variables. Now ∆pt reflects the evolution of the general human capital of the worker; ∆bt
reflects the specific evolution of outside opportunities, e.g. new technologies emerging in other
firms. Separations look like quits in this case: the worker quits because she can get a better job
elsewhere. In this case, the selectivity of job relocation is not so much that of the type "only
good jobs survive outside offers", but more of the type "only good outside offers kill the job".
3 Estimation Methodology
3.1 Identification
The model has in total eight structural parameters: 2 drift parameters µ, 3 (co)variances Σ,
the initial surplus Ω, the worker’s bargaining power β, and the variance of the transitory shock
σ2u. As shown in Section 2.3, the distribution of completed job tenures is fully determined
by two parameters, π and Ω, while wages are characterized by five parameters, σ, γ, µz, σz,
and σu. Hence, one can never hope to identify more than seven parameters, two from the
tenure distribution, and five from wages. The model is therefore identified up to one degree of
freedom. Equation (12) reveals why this is the case. Only the product σ ≡ βσ shows up, not
its components β and σ. Data on either the cost of necessary investment I or the productivity
pt would resolve this underidentification, offering direct information on σ. Then, β could be
established as σ/σ. However, neither type of data is available here.
We assume Ω and µp to depend on personal characteristics. We allow for both observed
and unobserved characteristics. As observable we enter experience at the moment of job start
S, measured in deviation from its sample mean. Since we have longitudinal data with multiple
job spells per individual, we can account for random worker effects; eΩ and eπ are normally
distributed, uncorrelated, random worker effects with zero mean and standard deviations σΩ
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and σπ respectively. We apply an exponential specification for Ω since this parameter is positive
by definition:
Ω = exp (ω0 + ω1S + eΩ) (13)
π = π0 + π1S + eπ
µz = µ0 + γσ (π1S + eπ)
Since experience at job start S enters the analysis in deviation from its mean across jobs, the
intercepts ω0, π0, and µ0 can be interpreted as the mean value for lnΩ, π, and µz respectively.
Our estimation strategy uses the recursive feature of our model. The parameters ω0,1, π0,1, σΩ
and σπ are estimable from job spell data. Estimates of these parameters are then used to
calculate conditional expectations and variances of the change in surplus∆Ωτ , in both completed
and incomplete job spells. The resulting expressions are subsequently employed in the analysis
of wage dynamics. Below, we first show how ω0,1, π0,1, σΩ and σπ can be estimated by maximum
likelihood from the tenure distribution; next, we derive a set of moment conditions for estimating
µ0, σ
2
z, σ, γ, and σ
2
u from the evolution of wages.
3.2 Maximum Likelihood Estimation of ω0,1 and π0,1
The contribution to the log likelihood function for an individual reads:
logL = ln
∫ ∫
J∏
j=1
F (Ψj)
1−dj · f(Θj)djdΦ
(
eΩ
σΩ
)
dΦ
(
eπ
σπ
)
(14)
where j is the jth job spell, and where dj is a dummy variable, taking the value dj = 1 if
the job spell is completed and dj = 0 otherwise. There are two reasons why we need to make
amendments to this likelihood function.
First, we could restrict the estimation to job spells starting within the observation range
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of our dataset. However, then we would not consider any of the jobs started before they were
first reported in the data; by construction, this would limit the maximum completed tenure
to the maximum time span, 17 years, covered by our PSID sample, cf. Section 4. Since long
tenures contain relevant information, we want to include also the spells ongoing at the start of
the sample. Since we observe these spells only conditional on the fact that they have lasted till
the start of the sample period, we correct the initial likelihood function for this conditioning:
logL = ln
∫ ∫
F (τ 1)
−1 J∏
j=1
F (Ψj)
1−dj · f(Θj)djdΦ( eΩ
σΩ
)dΦ(
eπ
σπ
) (15)
where τ1 is the tenure in the job at the start of its observation in the PSID (for which j = 1).
Second, since the PSID stock samples data at yearly intervals, job spells completed in less
than a year are underreported. We know the elapsed tenure in months at the first moment
a job spell is observed, by a retrospective question, but do not know whether there has been
another job spell between the job observed a year ago and the current job. Since the hazard
rate implied by our model is hump shaped, with the hump likely to be within the first year, cf.
Farber (1994), we are likely to overestimate Ω and π, as we miss part of the short tenures in
our data. One solution to this problem is to apply a similar conditioning as in equation (15),
where τ j is the initial tenure at the first moment the job is observed. However, this approach
does not use the distribution of τ j ’s itself. We can use this distribution if we are prepared to
make the additional assumption that the starting date of job spells is distributed uniformly over
the first year. Then, the density q (·) of initial dates of spells that started throughout the year
and are still incomplete at the end of the year satisfies: q (τ) = F (τ) /
∫ 1
0 F (x)dx. The total
contribution to the likelihood of a spell with initial tenure τ and completed tenure Θ is thus:
f (Θ)
F (τ)
q (τ) =
f (Θ)∫ 1
0 F (x) dx
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Hence, the final log likelihood, accounting both for the jobs started before their first reporting
in the PSID and for the underreporting of spells shorter than a year due to the stock sampling
scheme of the data, can be written:
logL = ln
∫ ∫
J∏
j=1
F (Ψj)
1−dj · f(Θj)dj
F (τ1)I(j=1)
(∫ 1
0 F (x)dx
)I(j =1)dΦ
(
eΩ
σΩ
)
dΦ
(
eπ
σπ
)
(16)
where I (y) is the indicator function, taking value 1 if y is true and 0 otherwise. We estimate the
log-likelihood function in (16) by Simulated Maximum Likelihood (SML). We report estimates
for two samples, a "small" one including only jobs starting within the observation range of our
PSID extract, and a "large" one including also the jobs ongoing at the start of the dataset.
3.3 Moment Conditions for Wage Dynamics
Using the maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters ω0,1, π0,1, σΩ and σπ, we can calculate
the conditional expectations and variances of ∆Ωτ . These expressions are then used for the
estimation of the parameters σ, γ, µ0, σz, and σu by a method of moments, using data on wage
changes. The conditions for the first two moments can be derived by substitution of equation
(13) in equation (12), and taking the expectation and the variance. This yields the following
system of equations:
∆wt = µ0 + γσπ1S + γσE∆Ωτ + εt (17)
wt −w∗t−1 = µ0 + γσπ1S + γσE∆Ω∗Θ + σΩ0 + ζt
∆w2t = σ
2
z + 2σ
2
u + (γσ)
2Var∆Ωτ + (µ0 + γσπ1S + γσE∆Ωτ )
2 + ηt
(
wt −w∗t−1
)2
= σ2z + 2σ
2
u + (γσ)
2Var∆Ω∗Θ + (µ0 + γσπS + γσE∆Ω
∗
Θ + σΩ0)
2 + νt
∆wt∆wt−1 = −σ2u + (µ0 + γσπ1S + γσE∆Ωτ ) (µ0 + γσπ1S + γσE∆Ωτ−1) + υt
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where εt, ζt, ηt, νt, and υt are i.i.d. errors, where superscript ∗ indicates the log wage
or respectively change in surplus just before separation from the previous job, and where
E∆Ωτ ≡ E[∆Ωτ |A (Θ) , B (Ψ)], and Var∆Ωτ ≡ Var[∆Ωτ |A (Θ) , B (Ψ)]. We impose no con-
straints upon the covariance matrix of these five error terms. In the third and fourth lines we
use Var[∆wt] =E
[
∆w2t
]−E[∆wt]2, where we substitute E[∆wt] with the deterministic part of
the right hand side in the first, and respectively the second equation. The first two equations are
the conditions for the first moment, for within and between job spell wage changes, respectively.
The second pair of equations are the conditions for the second moment, again for within and be-
tween job spell wage changes. The final moment condition is the covariance between subsequent
wage changes due to the transitory shocks ut.
The system of equations (17) is characterized by additive disturbances and nonlinear cross-
equation restrictions in the parameters. It can be estimated by Feasible Generalized Non-linear
Least Squares (FGNLS). Since we use ω0,1, π0,1, σΩ and σπ as estimated by Simulated Maximum
Likelihood (SML) in the first step analysis, c.f. section 3.2, in this second step we need to correct
the standard errors of the FGNLS estimates for the estimation error introduced by the SML.
We follow the methodology outlined by, e.g., Murphy and Topel (1985). Details on the FGNLS
estimation and on the adjustment of the standard errors of the FGNLS estimates are relegated
to our web appendix.
4 Empirical Analysis
4.1 Data
We use as data a PSID extract of 18 waves, covering the years 1975 through 1992. Our model
does not work well when employed people consider other alternatives than switching to another
job, such as retirement, leaving the labor force, or taking up full time education. The availability
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of these other alternatives yields two problems. First, we do not observe the reservation wage at
the point of separation when people do not accept another job. Second, with only one alternative
to the present job, the decision problem is simply whether a particular indicator switches signs.
With more alternatives, that choice process becomes far more complicated. Therefore we restrict
the sample to people who do not switch in and out the labor force regularly, and for whom
retirement is not a relevant option: white male heads of household, with more than 12 years of
education, and less than 60 years of age. Furthermore, we restrict the sample to those individuals
that were employed, temporarily laid off, or unemployed at the time of the survey. We exclude
people from Alaska or Hawaii. Finally, we discard all observations on unionized jobs. Through
these initial data selection procedures we discard in total 10351 observations from the original
dataset used by Altonji and Williams (1999).
For the analysis of wage dynamics, observations for which wages are missing (2404 obs.)
or topcoded (254 obs.) are deleted, as well as observations for which |∆wt| > 0.50 (276 obs.).
This leaves a total of 8082 observations on within-job wage changes, and 462 observations on
between-job wage changes. Wages are deflated by the implicit price deflator, using 1982 as base
year, as in Altonji and Williams (1999).
Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Observations
logwage(1) 2.42 0.52 0.17 4.82 13660
tenure (years) 6.67 7.42 0.08 43.69 15504
experience (years) 14.58 9.21 0.12 43.69 16179
Dataset for Estimating the Tenure Distribution Parameters(2)
Number of individuals 2421
Total number job spells 4681
- started before the observation range 1512
- started within the observation range 3169
Completed job spells 1712
- started before the observation range 372
- started within the observation range 1340
Incomplete job spells 2969
- started before the observation range 1140
- started within the observation range 1829
(1)reported average hourly wage, deflated using the implicit price deflator with 1982 base year
(2)subset of the data summarized in the top panel, keeping one observation for each job spell
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Table 1 presents summary statistics of the data. Tenure and experience measures are con-
structed by Altonji and Williams (1999). Observations with missing wage information are in-
cluded in the tenure distribution analysis. One can distinguish four types of job spells. Apart
from the distinction between completed and incomplete spells (right censoring), one can also
make a distinction between spells that start before the time span covered by our data and spells
that start afterwards. The lower half of the summary statistics table informs on the number of
spells for each of these four types.
4.2 The Parameters of the Tenure Distribution
Estimation results for the tenure distribution analysis, see equation (16) and parameter specifi-
cation (13), are presented in Table 2. Theoretically, the results for the "large sample", including
the jobs ongoing at the start date of the PSID sample, and for the "small sample", excluding
those jobs, should be identical. Both job exit hazards look indeed almost identical for the es-
timated mean values of lnΩ and π, see again Figure 1, with the peak in the hazard somewhat
lower for the large sample. Inspecting the estimates in Table 2 yields the same conclusion.
Table 2: SML estimates tenure distribution parameters equation (16)
Small Sample(1) Large Sample(2)
Variable π lnΩ π lnΩ
Intercept 0.226∗∗ -1.243 ∗∗ 0.141∗∗ -1.197∗∗
(t-val) (9.60) (-14.22) (83.96) (-73.50)
Initial experience 0.0088∗∗ -0.0057 0.012∗∗ 0.0025
(t-val) (2.95) (-0.57) (53.57) (1.38)
Random worker effects σ 0.309∗∗ 0.0022 5.76E-07 3.66E-05
(t-val) (5.77) (1.76E-03) (3.34E-04) (2.89E-03)
Observations (job spells) 3169 4681
Significance levels: † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1% . Statistical t-values in parentheses under
estimated coefficients.
(1)Small sample= sample of job spells starting within the observation range of the PSID sample
(2)Large sample= sample of all job spells, including those ongoing at the PSID sample start
All covariates are taken in deviations from their means over jobs
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The intercepts and the coefficients for experience at job start are very similar for both
samples. The positive effect of experience on the drift is consistent with the idea that workers
start their career with some initial job hopping, before settling down in a job that fits their
comparative advantages best. The intercept for π is positive and large for both samples. In
both cases, there are hardly observations for which π is negative. This implies that a fraction
of the job spells will last until the retirement of the worker. The fraction of jobs that never end
is about 10%, computed for the mean values of lnΩ and π.
An interesting observation is that while we find unobserved random worker effects for the
small sample, we do not find any for the large sample. The same result is found for a slightly
different specification of the model, see Teulings and Van der Ende (2000), or for slightly different
samples or specifications that we estimated, but do not report in the paper (i.e., including
unionized jobs, or including education as an explanatory variable). The main difference between
the samples is that the large one contains more long job spells, since it includes ongoing spells
at the start of the PSID extract. As pointed out earlier, estimates for the two samples should
be identical; since this is not the case, we suspect some form of misspecification of the empirical
model. Given that some prior studies have estimated considerable unobserved heterogeneity
in the PSID, see Browning et al (2010), this misspecification must be related to the sample
containing the long job spells. What form of misspecification of the hazard rate for long job
durations might explain our result? Part of the jobs last till retirement. Since our model does
not describe the outside option of leaving the market due to retirement, and we therefore exclude
workers above 60, a share of the jobs will never end according to this model. This explains why
we find the drift to be positive. As discussed in section 2.3, a positive drift implies the hazard
rate to be steadily declining to 0. Heterogeneity in the drift would strenghten this decline. Due
to selection, the sample of surviving job spells will be increasingly made up of workers with a
high drift. Hence, the hazard rate will decline more rapidly when there is heterogeneity in the
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drift than when there is not. The data do not support this rapid decline in the hazard, hence
the estimated zero variance of the random worker effect.
From this perspective, it is pertinent to compare our model with Jovanovic’s (1979) Bayesian
learning model, where the firm learns about the productivity of a match by subsequent real-
izations of its output. That model has a stochastic structure similar to the model considered
here. New information about the quality of a match is orthogonal to the previously collected
information. However, as times goes by, the quality of the firm’s information set improves and
new information will have a smaller impact. Hence, the hazard rate in learning models declines
much faster than in our model. The data strongly reject this rapid decline. Our model comes
a long way in explaining the slow decline in the hazard rate for long job spells. However, the
absence of unobserved heterogeneity in the drift suggests that the actual decline is even slower
than our model predicts.
Since the long spells started before the first wave of our PSID sample contain crucial infor-
mation, we focus on the results for Ω and π obtained from the full sample of job spells for the
subsequent wage dynamics analysis.
4.3 Wage Dynamics
The FGNLS estimation results of system (17) are reported in Table 3. The equations in (17)
impose a linear experience profile. However, the model can be easily extended with a concave
experience profile, since this affects rt and pt equally. We do so throughout the subsequent
analysis. As stated in Section 3.3, since we make use of the earlier estimated tenure distribution
parameters, we need to correct the variances of the FGNLS estimates for the error introduced
by the SML estimation. This two-step correction in the spirit of, e.g., Murphy and Topel (1985),
has absolutely no effects on the standard errors for any of our reported estimations (adjusted
variance-covariances are identical to the unadjusted ones up to 10 decimal digits).
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Estimates for a number of subsamples are reported in different horizontal panels. The
first panel uses all available data. All coefficients are significant and have the expected sign.
The coefficients on experience (t and t2) point to a standard concave experience profile. The
coefficient γ is estimated to be 0.792, relatively close to unity, implying that the correlation
between ∆pt and ∆bt is low. Separations look more like quits: they are driven more by random
positive shocks to the outside productivity than by negative shocks to the inside productivity.
Hence, the correlation of ∆Ωt with ∆wt is low, leading to a high estimated value of γ. Part of
the reason for the low correlation might be downward rigidity in wages; if so, the declining part
of the wage profile for a complete spell, cf. Figure 2, will not be realized.
Table 3: FGNLS estimates system (17)
µ0 γ σ¯
2 σu
2 σz
2 t t2 Avg Nobs
1: All Stayers+ Movers
coef 0.069∗∗ 0.729∗∗ 0.0012† 0.0046∗∗ 0.011∗∗ -0.0056∗∗ 9.80E-05∗∗ 4575
(t-val) (12.11) (4.25) (1.75) (14.90) (14.74) (-9.02) (6.53)
2: Incomplete and Positive Completed Surplus Change Spells for Stayers + Movers
coef 0.066∗∗ 0.512† 0.0014† 0.0046∗∗ 0.010∗∗ -0.0057∗∗ 9.90E-05∗∗ 3957
(t-val) (9.19) (1.64) (1.79) (14.12) (12.65) (-8.83) (6.17)
3: As panel 2 above, but using -Max(Ωτ
∗) as regressor for job movers
coef 0.067∗∗ 0.547∗ 0.0015† 0.0046∗∗ 0.010∗∗ -0.0057∗∗ 9.90E-05∗∗ 3957
(t-val) (9.66) (2.03) (1.87) (14.12) (12.81) (-8.40) (6.20)
Significance levels: † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%. Statistical t-values in parentheses under estimated coefficients.
We allow for a concave experience (t, t2) profile in all equations of system (17).
We investigate this issue by leaving out all observations for which ∆Ωτ is negative, i.e.
roughly the second half of all completed spells. This second set of estimates are reported in
panel 2 of Table 3. They are virtually the same, except for γ, which is now estimated to be
0.512, though not statistically significant. The downward rigidity in wages implies a large fall in
wages at the moment of separation. Hence, we further enter, with a negative sign, the maximum
of Ωτ in the previous job, −Max(Ω∗τ ), as regressor in the equation for job movers, instead of the
decline in the surplus in the last year before separation, E∆Ω∗Θ. We expect its coefficient to be
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γσ. The estimation results for this model are reported in panel 3. Once again, the estimation
results are virtually the same as in panel 2 of the table, except that the standard errors of all
coefficients become somewhat smaller; γ is also significant in this specification. The difference
in the estimated value of γ in panels 1 and 3 suggests that downward rigidity plays indeed a
role. Later on, we present a Wald test of this hypothesis.
The ranges of estimates obtained for the main parameters, γ = {0.51, 0.73}, and σ = 0.04,
enable us to compute the ’true’ return to tenure, σπ = 0.04×0.14 = 0.56% (taking the estimated
mean value of π = 0.14 from Table 2 above). However, the high values of γ imply that most
of the return to tenure, between 50% and 75%, takes the form of the log reservation wage rt
having a negative drift, instead of the inside wage wt having a positive drift, see equation (12).
The return to tenure measured as the rise in log productivity in the current job pt, is thus even
smaller, between γσπ = (1− 0.73)× 0.04× 0.14 = 0.15% and (1− 0.51)× 0.04× 0.14 = 0.27%.
Apart from this true return to tenure (linear by assumption), there is also a return to tenure
due to the selectivity in the evolution of bt in surviving jobs. Complete spells yield a hump
shaped pattern for Ωτ , while incomplete spells yield an increasing concave pattern for Ωτ , see
Figure 2. When there is downward rigidity, the hump shape for complete spells is reduced to
an increasing concave pattern, too. Hence, the concavity in the tenure profiles can be fully
explained by selectivity.
In the course of the life cycle, workers with the same level of experience t end up with different
elapsed tenure lengths, depending on their history of job mobility. The existence of a tenure
profile in wages implies that these differences translate into wage inequality. Since the tenure
profile can be decomposed in a deterministic part, γσπΨ, and a random part, γσΩτ , one can ask
what is the contribution of these two factors to expected wage growth and wage inequality. We
address this issue using the estimated parameter values π = 0.14 and Ω = 0.30, respectively γ =
0.60 (about the middle of the interval 0.51-0.73) and σ = 0.04. We do this decomposition for t =
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10, 20, 30 years of experience, using a recursive computation for identical persons, starting with 0
years of experience, and characterized by the tenure CDF given by (8). With respect to expected
log wage growth, the contribution of the deterministic component γσπE[Ψ|t] is 1.68%, 3.31%,
and 4.94% for t = 10, 20, 30 respectively. The contribution of the expected value of the random
component γσEΨ [E [Ωτ |B (Ψ)] |t] is 3.55%, 5.39%, and 6.94% respectively. Hence, the random
component has a larger effect on log wage growth, in particular for low levels of experience.
At higher levels of experience, job change becomes an unlikely event anyway and hence the
contribution of selectivity converges to a fixed number. With respect to wage inequality, the
contribution of the deterministic component is (γσπ)2Var[Ψ|t] and the stochastic component is
(γσ)2EΨ [Var [∆Ωτ |B (Ψ)] |t]. In this case, given the long experience lengths considered, both
the deterministic and the random component have almost identical overall contributions to
wage variance for these experience levels; however, the random component has a much larger
contribution to the wage inequality, about 20 times larger, compared to the deterministic one.
The deterministic components for 10, 20 and 30 years are 5.08e-06, 5.35e-06 and 5.37e-06, with
the corresponding stochastic components at 1.11e-04, 1.20e-04 and respectively 1.21e-04.
The estimation results in Table 3 use all available information on first and second moments
of wage changes, simultaneously. A specification test is to estimate the model separately for
relevant subsets of the data, e.g. job stayers versus job movers, complete versus incomplete
spells, or first versus second moments, and verify whether the coefficient estimates are the same.
Before reporting formal nested hypotheses tests, linear regression estimates for such data subsets
can already be informative. Table 4 displays OLS estimates for the first moments, i.e. the first
two equations of system (17). The regressions in columns D and G, complete spells with an
increasing surplus (∆Ωτ ≥ 0) and respectively job movers, are badly identified due to a low
number of observations. The other columns reveal some common patterns. First, the intercept
and the experience profile are virtually the same in all regressions. Second, the coefficient of γσ
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is negative, though never statistically significant, while it is expected to be positive. This term
captures the earlier result from the tenure distribution analysis that the drift in the surplus Ωt
depends positively on experience at job start S, equivalent to stating that jobs starting at later
age last longer. Given that γ > 0, the model predicts that workers are able to capture part of
the surplus increase, and hence, that the tenure profile in jobs starting at higher ages should be
steeper. The data reject this implication.
Table 4: OLS estimates 1st moments (first 2 equations) of system (17)
A B C D E F G
µ0 0.059
∗∗ 0.061∗∗ 0.043∗∗ -0.021 0.050∗∗ 0.046∗∗ -8.593
(t-val) (9.00) (4.12) (3.34) (-0.36) (2.65) (4.19) (-0.97)
γσ¯ -0.013 -0.071 -0.054 -0.529 -0.011 -0.048 0.497
(t-val) (-0.57) (-0.10) (-1.60) (-1.51) (-0.14) (-1.56) (1.07)
(1-γ)2σ¯2 6.40E-05∗ 6.40E-05 9.61E-04∗ 0.0045† 4E-06 8.41E-04† 0.0031
(t-val) (2.37) (1.53) (2.14) (1.96) (0.27) (2.34) (0.58)
σ¯
2 857.43
(t-val) (1.00)
t -5.01E-03∗∗ -5.25E-03∗∗ -4.39E-03∗∗ -2.92E-03 -4.64E-02∗ -4.57E-03∗∗ 0.039
(t-val) (-7.17) (-3.00) (-4.99) (-0.06) (-2.31) (-5.58) (0.76)
t2 9.19E-05∗∗ 1.08E-04∗ 8.33E-05∗∗ 1.44E-04 9.44E-05† 8.62E-05∗∗ -8.23E-05
(t-val) (5.6) (2.23) (4.42) (1.29) (1.73) (4.78) (-0.32)
Nobs 8082 1572 6510 435 1137 6945 462
Significance levels: † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%. Statistical t-values in parentheses under estimated coefficients.
Columns A to F correspond to the 1st moment eq. for job stayers (1st eq. of system 17), where A- All Stayers,
B- Completed Spells, C- Incomplete Spells, D- Completed Positive Surplus Change Spells, E- Completed Negative
Surplus Change, F- Incomplete plus Completed Positive Surplus Change; Column G corresponds to the 1st moment
eq for job movers (2nd eq of system 17).
We allow for a concave experience (t, t2) profile in each estimated equation.
Table 5 presents linear regression results for the 2nd moments, i.e. the last three equations of
system (17). The estimates invoke three observations. First, contrary to the predictions of our
model, the estimates for (γσ)2 are negative. The model predicts a hump shape in the variance
of ∆wt over the course of a job spell, with low variances in the beginning and the end of a
job. The data tell the opposite. Thus, while the model accurately captures the concavity in the
tenure profile in the first moment of ∆wt, in particular when accounting for downward rigidity
in wages, it does not capture the pattern in its second moment. Second, the variance σ2z + σ
2
u
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is a factor four times higher for job movers than for job stayers. This suggest that the labour
market is not a Walrasian market with a continuum of outside offers available at any time,
where workers who want to change jobs can just the pick the best option out of this continuum.
Outside offers come along randomly, so that there are large jumps in the wage profile at the
moment of job change. Third, within the group of job stayers, the variance does not seem to
be constant across subgroups either; it is the largest for the incomplete spells and the smallest
for the complete spells with a declining surplus (∆Ωτ < 0), whereas the complete spells with
an increasing surplus fall somewhere in between. The low variance for complete spells with a
declining surplus fits the notion of downward wage rigidity. When wages are rigid, one would
not expect a whole lot of variance.
Table 5: OLS estimates 2nd moments (last 3 equations) of system (17)
A B C D E F G H I
(1-γ)2σ¯2 -0.0081∗∗ -0.010† -0.025∗∗ -0.016 -0.010∗ -0.019∗∗ -0.089
(t-val) (-3.28) (-1.88) (-4.55) (-1.16) (-1.82) (-4.42) (-0.53)
σz
2+2σu
2 0.027∗∗ 0.025∗∗ 0.042∗∗ 0.032∗∗ 0.025∗∗ 0.036∗∗ 0.156∗∗
(t-val) (12.28) (8.33) (8.49) (3.51) (7.73) (9.60) (2.98)
σu
2 0.0042∗∗ 0.0043∗∗
(t-val) (14.01) (13.28)
Nobs 8082 1572 6510 435 1137 6945 462 5789 4972
Significance levels: † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%. Statistical t-values in parentheses under estimated coefficients.
Columns A to F correspond to the 2nd moment for job stayers (3rd eq. of system 17), where A- All Stayers,
B- Completed Spells, C- Incomplete Spells, D- Completed Positive Surplus Change Spells, E- Completed Negative
Surplus Change, F- Incomplete plus Completed Positive Surplus Change; Column G corresponds to the 2nd moment
for job movers (4th eq. of system 17); Columns H to I correspond to the covariance moment (last eq. of system 17),
with H using All Stayers and I using the Incomplete plus Positive Completed Surplus Change Spells.
We use the residuals computed from corresponding 1st moments of system (17), upgraded with concave experience
profiles, as dependent variables in all 2nd moment equations.
Table 6 presents formal Wald tests for the above hypotheses, reporting χ2 statistics and
associated p-values for tests of equality of estimates across nested model specifications for the
system (17). All tests start from the full model (using the whole number of observations, on
both stayers and movers), except for horizontal panel 6 which presents nested hypotheses tests
for the subsample of job stayers. Panel 1 presents three Wald tests for the null hypotheses
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{γs = γm}, {σ2s = σ2m}, and the joint null {γs = γm and σ2s = σ2m}, where s indexes stayers and
m movers. The null {γs = γm} cannot be rejected, but the null
{
σ2s = σ
2
m
}
can. Hence, the joint
null {γs = γm and σ2s = σ2m} is also rejected. This suggests that there is excess wage variance for
job movers. Hence, our assumption of a Walrasian market for outside job offers is not respected
in the data. Panel 2 presents a Wald test for {γneg = γrest}, where γneg is estimated only for
the completed job spells with a negative surplus change, ∆Ωτ < 0, while γrest is estimated on
the rest of the sample. We fail to reject the null of γ being the same for the negative job spells
and for the rest of the observations.
Table 6: Nested hypotheses tests for subset estimates system (17)
1: γs=γm, σ¯s
2=σ¯m
2
Wald γs=γm χ
2=0.37 (Prob>χ2=0.54)
Wald σ¯s
2=σ¯m
2
χ
2=5.60∗(Prob>χ2=0.018)
Joint Wald γs=γm and σ¯s
2=σ¯m
2 χ2=5.80†(Prob>χ2=0.055)
2: γneg=γrest
Wald γneg=γrest χ
2=1.64 (Prob>χ2=0.20)
3: γdrift=γnondrift
Wald γdrift=γnondrift χ
2=31.43∗∗(Prob>χ2<.0001)
4: γfirst=γsecond
Wald γfirst=γsecond χ
2=0.45 (Prob>χ2=0.50)
5: σz,s
2=σz,m
2
Wald σz,s
2=σz,m
2 χ2=37.45∗∗(Prob>χ2<.0001)
6: σz,s,inc
2=σz,s,neg
2, σz,s,inc
2=σz,s,pos
2, σz,s,neg
2=σz,s,pos
2
Wald σz,s,inc
2=σz,s,neg
2
χ
2=2.08 (Prob>χ2=0.149)
Wald σz,s,inc
2=σz,s,pos
2
χ
2=0.04 (Prob>χ2=0.833)
Wald σz,s,neg
2=σz,s,pos
2
χ
2=1.82 (Prob>χ2=0.177)
Joint Wald σz,s,inc
2=σz,s,neg
2 and σz,s,inc
2=σz,s,pos
2
χ
2=2.17 (Prob>χ2=0.338)
Significance levels: † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%. Statistical p-values in parentheses.
Detailed description for each hypothesis test can be found in the text; "m" indexes movers, "s" stayers, "inc" incomplete job
spells, "pos" ("neg") completed positive (negative) surplus change job spells. The test in panel 4 is de facto implemented
as H0:k12=k2, where k1=1-γfirst and k2=(1-γsecond)
2, since, as k2 is estimated negative in the corresponding linear
regression, γsecond cannot take a real value in that particular specification.
All specifications allow for concave experience (t, t2) profiles.
Panel 3 presents the Wald test of {γdrift = γnondrift}, where γdrift is estimated from the drift
term in the first moment equations, while γnondrift is estimated from all other instances where
it appears in the system (17). As expected from earlier remarks, we strongly reject this null.
Panel 4 presents the Wald test of {γfirst = γsec ond}. This restriction cannot be rejected. Panel
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5 displays the result of the Wald for {σ2z,s = σ2z,m}, i.e. testing for equality of the variance of the
permanent shocks, σ2z, across movers and stayers. This null is clearly rejected. Given our result
from panel 5, we now start from a model where we allow for different σ2z,s and σ
2
z,m: in panel
6 we test in subsamples of job stayers only the following null hypotheses: {σ2z,s,inc = σ2z,s,neg},
{σ2z,s,pos = σ2z,s,neg}, {σ2z,s,inc = σ2z,s,pos}, and respectively the joint {σ2z,s,inc = σ2z,s,neg and
σ2z,s,inc = σ
2
z,s,pos}, where inc indexes incomplete job spells, neg completed job spells with
∆Ωτ < 0, as above, and pos completed job spells with ∆Ωτ ≥ 0 These tests show that once
we account for the differences in σ2z between movers and stayers, there are no further statistical
differences between the estimates for subsamples of stayers: indeed, we cannot reject any of the
null hypotheses from panel 6 of table 6.
Table 7: FGNLS estimates system (17), with different wage variances
for stayers and movers
µ0 γ σ¯s
2 σ¯m
2 σu
2 σz
2 t t2 Avg Nobs
1: All Stayers+ Movers
coef 0.071∗∗ 0.812∗∗ 0.0018∗∗ 0.301∗∗ 0.0046∗∗ 0.011∗∗ -0.0057∗∗ 9.9E-05∗∗ 4575
(t-val) (13.94) (36.61) (3.17) (2.78) (14.90) (14.82) (-9.48) (6.66)
2: Incomplete and Positive Completed Surplus Change Spells for Stayers + Movers
coef 0.073∗∗ 0.811∗∗ 0.0024∗∗ 0.291∗∗ 0.0046∗∗ 0.010∗∗ -5.96E-03∗∗ 1.03E-04∗∗ 3957
(t-val) (13.39) (35.83) (2.54) (2.73) (14.13) (13.59) (-9.18) (6.52)
3: As panel 2 above, but using -Max(Ωτ
∗) as regressor for job movers
coef 0.074∗∗ 0.852∗∗ 0.0021∗ 0.150∗∗ 0.0046∗∗ 0.010∗∗ -0.0059∗∗ 1.03E-04∗∗ 3957
(t-val) (13.35) (35.94) (2.28) (3.15) (14.13) (13.69) (-9.11) (6.50)
Significance levels: † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%. Statistical t-values in parentheses under estimated coefficients.
We allow for a concave experience (t, t2) profile in all equations of system (17).
Once we allow movers and stayers to possibly have different wage variances, the new FGNLS
estimates reported in Table 7 show that movers have indeed a much higher wage variance at job
separation; our favorite specification in panel 3 suggests σm ≃ 8.4σs. In this case, γ is estimated
in a much narrower range, between 0.81 and 0.85, with all the other parameter estimates close
to the values from Table 3. We repeat the previous calculation of the return to tenure, this
time with σs = 0.04, and γ = 0.8. We obtain a return which is exactly the same as computed
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before, σsπ = 0.04 × 0.14 = 0.56%, again mostly due to the fall in the outside option. The
drift in pt accounts now for only γσsπ = (1− 0.8)× 0.56% = 0.11%. Hence, once we adjust our
empirical model to allow for downward rigidity of wages and for the non-Walrasian market for
job switches, about 80% of the wage returns to tenure is due to selectivity on the outside wages.
A Conditional Expectation and Variance of Ωτ
A.1 Completed Spells
For the subsequent derivations, it is useful to add the parameter for initial surplus, Ω, as an argu-
ment to the survival function of job tenures in equations (8) and (9), thus F (τ,Ω) and f (τ,Ω).
Let h (ω, τ,Θ,Ω) be the density of Ωτ = ω for 0 < τ < Θ conditional on A (Θ). Comparing
this density to g (ω, τ), there is one additional condition: ΩΘ = 0. Hence, h (ω, τ,Θ,Ω) can be
calculated by applying Bayes’s rule. Since Ωτ is a martingale, the distribution of Θ conditional
on Ωτ = ω is equal to the distribution of Θ − τ conditional on Ω0 = ω. Hence, its density is
f (Θ− τ, ω). Then h (ω, τ,Θ,Ω) can be calculated from f (·) and g (·), by Bayes’s rule:
h(ω, τ,Θ,Ω) =
f(Θ− τ, ω)g (ω, τ)∫∞
0 f(Θ− τ, x)g (x, τ) dx
Substitution of equation (7) in the above yields:
h(ω, τ,Θ,Ω) =
ω
Ωm
√
mτ
[
φ
(
ω −mΩ√
mτ
)
− φ
(
ω +mΩ√
mτ
)]
where m ≡ (Θ− τ) /Θ. Hence, E(Ωτ |A (Θ)) satisfies:
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E(Ωτ |A (Θ)) =
∫ ∞
0
ωh(ω, τ,Θ,Ω)dω
=
∫ ∞
0
ω2
Ωm
√
mτ
[
φ
(
ω −mΩ√
mτ
)
− φ
(
ω +mΩ√
mτ
)]
dω
= 2
√
mτφ
(√
m
τ
Ω
)
−
( τ
Ω
+mΩ
)[
1− 2Φ
(√
m
τ
Ω
)]
For the calculation of the second moment of a first differential of Ωτ , E
[
∆Ω2τ |A (Θ)
]
, we
apply the joint density of Ωτ−1 = ω and Ωτ = ω + χ, for 1 ≤ τ ≤ /Θ, conditional on A (Θ):
h(ω + χ, 1,Θ− τ + 1, ω) · h(ω, τ − 1,Θ,Ω)
The second moment of ∆Ωτ is thus given by:
E
[
∆Ω2τ |A (Θ)
]
=
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
−ω
χ2h(ω + χ, 1,Θ− τ + 1, ω)dχ · h(ω, τ − 1,Θ,Ω)dω
We use numerical integration for the evaluation of the integral above. The variance is subse-
quently derived by the standard expression Var[∆Ωτ |A (Θ)] =E
[
∆Ω2τ |A (Θ)
]−E[∆Ωτ |A (Θ)]2.
A.2 Incomplete Spells
Let h∗(ω, τ,Ψ,Ω) be the density of Ωτ = ω conditional on B (Ψ). Application of the Bayes rule
yields:
h∗(ω, τ,Ψ,Ω) =
F (Ψ− τ, ω)g (ω, τ)∫∞
0 F (Ψ− τ, x)g (x, τ) dx
Hence, E(Ωτ |B (Ψ)) satisfies:
E [Ωτ |B (Ψ)] =
∫ ∞
0
ωh∗(ω, τ,Ψ,Ω)dω =
∫∞
0 ωF (Ψ− τ, ω)g (ω, τ)dω∫∞
0 F (Ψ− τ, ω)g (ω, τ)dω
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where F (Ψ − τ, ω) is given by equation (8). This expression is evaluated numerically, since it
does not have an analytical solution.
The variance of ∆Ωτ = Ωτ −Ωτ−1, for 1 ≤ τ ≤ Ψ, conditional on B (Ψ) is then derived from
the first and second moments of ∆Ωτ , analogous to the completed spells case discussed above.
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